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)RUHZRUG
This report presents an overview of differentiation methods for national greenhouse gas
reduction targets. The main features of differentiation proposals from climate policy
negotiations are presented in a catalogue style. The proposals are from the period 1995 to
1997. In 1995 the Berlin mandate was adopted, which initiated the negotiation process that
ended up in the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change in December 1997. In addition the European Community’s Triptique approach for
differentiation of targets within the union is included. Furthermore, some contributions from
recent academic literature are reviewed.
The Kyoto Protocol has set a significant precedence for climate target negotiations in the
future, and particularly with respect to differentiation of targets between countries. A
provision is that a sufficient number of parties ratify the Kyoto Protocol to make it enter into
force in the next few years. However, the approach taken to target differentiation in the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations is likely to be insufficient for future negotiations. Thus a more
systematic approach is deemed necessary to undertake future negotiations on climate targets
after the present target period has ended in 2012. This argument can be strengthened if more
ambitious future targets than the present targets are sought. Furthermore, a more systematic
approach to target differentiation is essential for a later inclusion of developing countries in
the group of countries with climate targets.
The most promising methods or proposals in terms of being potentially helpful for future
negotiations on differentiation are extracted. Finally some numerical illustrations for the most
promising proposals are given for the countries in the Baltic Sea region.
The present report is to some extent a follow-up to an earlier report to the Nordic Council of
Ministers; “Climate Policy, Burden Sharing and the Nordic Countries – Present State of
Analysis and Need for Further Analysis” (see Ringius et al., 1996).
Asbjørn Torvanger and Odd Godal from CICERO (Center for International Climate and
Environmental Research – Oslo) produced the report in the period October 1998 to February
1999. The authors want to thank our colleague Lasse Ringius for valuable contributions.
The report was commissioned by the Nordic Council of Ministers’ ‘Samarbetsgrupp mellan
energi- och miljösidan’. It is scheduled for printing in the Nordic Council of Ministers’ Tema
Nord report series.
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([HFXWLYHVXPPDU\
The aim of this report is to contribute to exploring the potential of differentiation methods for
national greenhouse gas reduction targets. Such methods can also be referred to as burden
sharing methods or schemes. As a first step in this exploration project a survey of existing
differentiation proposals is helpful. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) from 1997 established differentiation of targets
among countries, but not in any systematic manner. Our opinion is that a more systematic
approach to differentiation will facilitate future negotiations. Future negotiations to determine
national targets after 2012 are likely to occur, and sooner or later there will be a discussion of
commitments for developing countries. More elaborated approaches and methods for
differentiation will not solve all political differences and problems, but could be helpful and
contribute a guiding framework for climate policy negotiations.
Three sources of methods or proposals are employed. The first are proposals from the Ad Hoc
Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) process from 1995 until the Kyoto Protocol was
adopted in December 1997. From this negotiation process we identified and selected all
proposals that implied some type of differentiation of targets. Altogether this came to 17
proposals made by a single party or groups of parties. The second source is the European
Community’s Triptique approach for differentiation of targets among its member states. The
third source is recent academic literature, where we have included 8 contributions that we
found interesting from the period 1992 to 1998. The proposals are presented in a catalogue
style.
Based on 4 criteria on the usefulness of proposals or methods for future negotiations we have
chosen 5 proposals as representing the most interesting and promising contributions. These
criteria are political acceptability, feasibility related to negotiations, regional or global
relevance of method, and the potential for developing the method further. The most promising
contributions are the second proposal by Japan, the French proposal, the Norwegian proposal,
the Brazilian proposal further developed by the Dutch RIVM research institute, and finally,
EU’s Triptique approach:
¤  7KHVHFRQG-DSDQHVHSURSRVDOwhere each party should reduce their emissions by 5%
compared to 1990 levels. However, if emissions per unit of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), or emissions per capita, are lower than the average of all parties, the target is
proportionally reduced. Likewise the target is proportionally reduced if population growth
is higher than average.
¤  7KH)UHQFKSURSRVDOwhere targets are differentiated so that emission pathways converge
to similar per capita or per unit of GDP levels by the end of the next century, with the aim
of keeping atmospheric concentrations of CO2 below 550 ppmv.
¤  7KH1RUZHJLDQSURSRVDOwhere each party’s percentage reduction target is distributed
according to the weighted sum of the three indicators CO2 equivalent emissions per unit of
GDP, GDP per capita, and CO2 equivalent emissions per capita, such that those parties
that have higher than average values for these indicators also get a higher than average
target, and vice versa.
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¤  7KH%UD]LO5,90SURSRVDOwhere targets are differentiated according to each party’s
historical responsibility for global warming, in terms of accumulated contribution to
radiative forcing in the atmosphere since the industrial revolution.
¤  (8¶V7ULSWLTXHDSSURDFKwhere the differences in emission-producing activities across
the member states are accounted for through dividing each national economy into the
three sectors electricity generation, energy-intensive industries, and other domestic
sectors. In the electricity generation sector emissions are distributed according to
minimum penetration of renewables, limits to fossil fuel use, and use of nuclear power.
The energy-intensive industries are allowed to increase production at a constant rate based
on the same energy-efficiency improvement rate. Finally, emissions from other domestic
sectors are distributed on a per capita basis, to converge to the same future level.
For the purpose of showing differentiation consequences of the selected methods, we supply
some numerical illustrations for the Baltic Sea region. The countries in this region are the
Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic countries
(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), in addition to Germany, Poland, and the Russian Federation.
Given the joint Kyoto Protocol reduction target for the countries in the Baltic Sea region we
compare the burden sharing consequences for one proposal or method across countries, and
for one country across the methods or proposals. The comparison is based on the distribution
of percentage emission reduction targets across the countries in the region. For the
illustrations we employ the following fairness principles as differentiation methods:
• 7KH6RYHUHLJQW\SULQFLSOH; interpreted as reduction of emissions proportionally across all
countries to maintain the relative emission level between them;
• 7KH(JDOLWDULDQSULQFLSOH interpreted as reduction of emissions in proportion to
population (i.e. equal per capita emission); and
• 7KH$ELOLW\WRSD\SULQFLSOH interpreted as differentiation of climate targets such that the
net abatement cost is positively correlated with per capita GDP.
Furthermore, illustrations are given for the second Japanese proposal, the French proposal,
and the Norwegian proposal. No illustrations are given for the Brazil-RIVM proposal and
EU’s Triptique approach, since the required calculations would be outside the scope of this
report. The results should only be taken as illustrations to illuminate differences between
differentiation methods.
Comparing the distribution of commitments across countries generated by the differentiation
proposals we find that the span between the largest and smallest targets is much larger for the
single fairness principles ‘Egalitarian’ and ‘Ability to pay’ than for the three proposals from
the climate negotiations. In the latter three proposals Estonia and the Russian Federation have
to reduce their emissions by much more than the average reduction for the Baltic Sea region
countries of 6%. In the Norwegian proposal the heaviest burden falls on Poland. According to
the French proposal Sweden and Iceland are allowed to increase their emissions due to a
relatively low present emission level. The Nordic countries and Germany are allowed to
increase their emissions substantially given the Egalitarian principle. However, given the
Ability to pay principle these countries would get a much larger burden than the other
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countries. The results for proposals from the climate negotiations all lie between these
extremes; that is between +9% (the French proposal for Sweden) and -12% (the French
proposal for Estonia).
With the aim to evaluate the political feasibility of the various differentiation methods we
compare the results from chapter 6 across the countries in the Baltic Sea region, and divide
them into OECD and EIT countries. Furthermore, we interpret the outcome of the Kyoto
Protocol (and the internal differentiation scheme within the European Community) as an
example of a politically feasible differentiation scheme, which may then serve as a benchmark
for comparison with the differentiation methods evaluated here.
On the basis of these observations we find that the Sovereignty and Egalitarian methods seem
less interesting. The first method yields no differentiation, and the latter is too extreme in the
short run since it equalises per capita emissions. Second, the Ability to pay method puts the
largest burden on the OECD countries, whereas the Japan II proposal, the French proposal,
and to some the degree the Norwegian proposal, put the largest burden on EIT countries.
Third, all the methods explored provide Russia with a stricter target than the Kyoto Protocol,
while the opposite situation is the case for Denmark and Germany. And finally, fourth, Japan
II is the proposal that yields targets closest to the Kyoto Protocol, followed by the French and
the Norwegian proposal. The three fairness principles based methods cause larger deviations
from the Kyoto Protocol outcome.
Consequently one might argue that a ranking of the differentiation methods according to
political feasibility should be: 1. Japan II, 2. French, 3. Norwegian, 4. Ability to pay, 5.
Sovereignty, and 6. Egalitarian. However, putting more emphasis on the second conclusion
above, one might claim that the Ability to pay based method should have a higher ranking,
and maybe be ranked in first place. The argument for this would be that it is unfair, and
consequently also less politically feasible, to demand that the relatively poorer EIT countries
should reduce their emissions by a larger percentage than the OECD countries.
Among the countries in the Baltic Sea region Poland might be taken as proxy of a developing
country due to its relatively low per capita GDP and its average per capita emissions of
greenhouse gases. With this provision the most promising methods for involving developing
countries seem to be based on the Ability to pay principle and the French proposal, since these
methods are likely to yield relatively softer targets for developing countries.
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1RUVNVDPDQGUDJ1RUZHJLDQDEVWUDFW
Føremålet med denne rapporten er å undersøkje potensialet til metodar for differensiering av
nasjonale mål for å redusere utslepp av klimagassar. Slike metodar blir også referert til som
byrdefordelingsmetodar. Eit fyrste skritt er å få oversikt over metodar for differensiering som
er foreslått. Kyotoprotokollen til FN sin Klimakonvensjon frå 1997 etablerte prinsippet om
differensiering av mål mellom land, men utan å leggje ein systematisk metode til grunn. Vår
oppfatning er at ei meir systematisk tilnærming til differensiering vil kunne forenkle
framtidige klimaforhandlingar. Framtidige forhandlingar for å fastsetje nasjonale mål etter
2012 er sannsynlege, og før eller sidan må det bli ein diskusjon om forpliktingar for
utviklingsland. Meir sofistikerte tilnærmingar og metodar vil kunne vere hjelpsame og vil
kunne gje eit nyttig rammeverk for framtidige klimaforhandlingar.
Tre kjelder til metodar og framlegg er brukt. Den første er framlegg frå ”Ad Hoc Group on
the Berlin Mandate” (AGBM) prosessen som enda opp med Kyotoprotokollen i desember
1997. Frå denne forhandlingsprosessen har vi identifisert og valt ut alle framlegg som innebar
ein eller anna type differensiering av reduksjonsmål. I alt vart det 17 framlegg frå einskilde
partar eller grupper av partar. Den andre kjelda er Triptique-tilnærminga for å differensiere
mål mellom medlemsstatane i EU. Den tredje kjelda er nyare akademisk litteratur, der vi har
plukka ut 8 artiklar frå perioden 1992 til 1998 som vi fann interessante. Alle metodar og
framlegg er presenterte i eit katalogformat.
Basert på 4 kriterium på kor nyttige framlegg eller metodar kan vere for framtidige
forhandlingar har vi valt ut 5 framlegg som dei mest interessant og lovande. Desse kriteria er
politisk aksept, i kva grad kan metoden brukast i ein forhandlingssituasjon, regional eller
global relevans, og potensialet for å utvikle metoden vidare. Dette er det andre framlegget til
Japan, the franske framlegget, det norske framlegget, det brasilianske framlegget
vidareutvikla av det nederlandske RIVM forskingsinstituttet, og til sist, EU si Triptique-
tilnærming:
¤  'HWDQGUHMDSDQVNHIRUVODJHW; der kvart land skal redusere utsleppa sine med 5%
samanlikna med nivået i 1990. Dersom utsleppa per eining BNP eller utslepp per capita er
lavare enn gjennomsnittet for alle land i gruppa blir målet redusert frå 5% i same
proporsjon. På same måte blir målet redusert dersom veksten i folketalet er høgare enn
gjennomsnittet i gruppa av land.
¤  'HWIUDQVNHIRUVODJHWder måla blir differensiert slik at utsleppsbanane konvergerer mot
same per capita nivå eller mot same utsleppsnivå per eining BNP mot slutten av neste
hundreår, der siktemålet er å halde konsentrasjonen i atmosfæren under 550 ppmv.
¤  'HWQRUVNHIRUVODJHW der kvart land sin prosentvise reduksjon blir fordelt etter den vekta
summen av dei tre indikatorane CO2 ekvivalente utslepp per eining BNP, BNP per capita,
og CO2 ekvivalente utslepp per capita, slik at dei landa som har høgare verdiar enn
gjennomsnittet for desse indikatorane i gruppa av landa får eit høgare mål, og vice versa.
¤  )RUVODJHWWLO%UDVLO5,90der måla blir differensierte etter kvart land sitt historiske
ansvar for global oppvarming, målt etter akkumulerte utslepp av klimagassar i atmosfæren
og gjennom det påverknad på strålingspådrivet sidan den industrielle revolusjonen.
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¤  (8VL7ULSWLTXHWLOQ UPLQJ der ein tek utgangspunkt i forskjellane i utsleppsgenererande
aktivitetar mellom landa ved å dele økonomien i eit land inn i tre hovudsektorar:
produksjon av straum, energi-intensive sektorar, og andre innanlandske sektorar. I
sektoren for produksjon av straum blir utsleppa fordelt etter eit minimumsnivå for bruken
av vedvarande energikjelder, skrankar på bruken av fossile energivarer, og bruken av
kjernekraft. Dei energi-intensive industriane får lov å auke sin produksjon etter ein
konstant rate basert på same rate for forbetringar i energieffektiviteten. Utsleppa frå andre
innanlandske sektorar blir fordelt på per capita basis, slik at dei konvergerer mot same
nivå i framtida.
For å samanlikne differensieringskonsekvensane av dei valde framlegga har vi produsert
nokre numeriske illustrasjonar for land i Austersjø-området. Landa i denne regionen er dei
Nordiske landa Danmark, Finland, Island, Noreg og Sverige, dei baltiske landa Estland,
Latvia og Litauen, i tillegg til Tyskland, Polen og Russland.
Med utgangspunkt i reduksjonsmåla frå Kyotoprotokollen for landa i Austersjø-regionen har
vi samanlikna byrdefordelingskonsekvensane av eit framlegg mellom alle landa, og for kvart
land mellom alle framlegga. Samanlikninga er basert på fordelinga av prosentvise
reduksjonsmål mellom landa i regionen. I illustrasjonane blir desse rettferdsprinsippa brukte
for å differensiere utsleppsmåla mellom landa:
¤  6XYHUHQLWHWVSULQVLSSHW tolka som ein proporsjonal reduksjon i utsleppa over alle land slik
at det relative utsleppsnivået ligg fast;
¤  (JDOLWDULWHWVSULQVLSSHW tolka som ein proporsjonal utsleppsreduksjon etter folketalet
(d.v.s. like per capita utslepp); og
¤  %HWDOLQJVHYQHSULQVLSSHW tolka som differensiering av reduksjonsmål slik at netto kostnad
ved klimatiltaka er positivt korrelert med BNP per capita.
Vidare har vi teke med illustrasjonar for det andre japanske forslaget, det franske forslaget, og
the norske forslaget. Vi har ingen illustrasjonar for det brasilianske framlegget og Triptique
ettersom dette ville krevje utrekningar som ligg utanfor rammene for denne rapporten.
Resultata bør berre oppfattast som illustrasjonar som kan vise forskjellar mellom metodane og
framlegga til differensiering.
Når vi samanliknar byrdefordelingskonsekvensane mellom land som følgjer av framlegga finn
vi at spennet mellom dei største og minste reduksjonsmåla er mykje større for dei enkle
rettferdsprinsippa ’Egalitær’ og ’Betalingsevne’ enn for dei tre framlegga frå
klimaforhandlingane. I dei tre framlegga frå klimaforhandlingane må Estland og Russland
redusere sine utslepp mykje meir enn gjennomsnittet for alle landa Austersjø-regionen, som er
på 6%. I den norske framlegget fell den største byrden på Polen. Ut frå det franske framlegget
vil Sverige og Island kunne auke sine utslepp fordi dei per i dag har lave utslepp per capita.
Dei nordiske landa og Tyskland kan auke sine utslepp monaleg ut frå det Egalitære prinsippet.
Men skulle Betalingsevneprinsippet bli lagt til grunn vil desse landa få ei større byrde enn dei
andre landa. Byrdefordelingskonsekvensane av framlegg frå klimaforhandlingsprosessen ligg
alle mellom desse ytterverdiane; det vil seie mellom +9% (det franske framlegget for Sverige)
og –12% (det franske framlegget for Estland).
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For å vurdere i kva grad differensieringsmetodane kan gjennomførast politisk sett samanliknar
vi resultata frå kapittel 6 for landa i Austersjø-området og grupperer dei i OECD- og EIT-land
(omstillingsøkonomiar). Vidare ser vi på dei nasjonale måla i Kyotoprotokollen (og den
interne byrdefordelinga i EU) som eit døme på eit politisk akseptabelt differensieringsutfall.
Dei nasjonale måla frå Kyotoprotokollen kan såleis brukast som ein målestokk på i kva grad
metodane politisk sett kan gjennomførast når vi samanliknar med resultata frå dei
differensieringsmetodane vi drøftar her.
På bakgrunn av desse observasjonane finn vi at ’Suverenitet’ og ’Egalitær’ metodane er
mindre interessante. Den fyrste av desse metodane gjev ingen differensiering, og den andre er
for ekstrem på kort sikt fordi den krev like per capita utslepp. Den andre konklusjonen er at
’Betalingsevne’ vil leggje størst byrde OECD landa, medan Japan II, det franske framlegget,
og til ein viss grad det norske framlegget, legg størst byrde på omstillingsøkonomiane. For det
tredje fører alle metodane til ein større byrde for Russland enn Kyotoprotokollen, medan det
motsette er tilfelle for Danmark og Tyskland. Og, for det fjerde er Japan II det framlegget som
gjev mål som ligg nærast Kyotoprotokollen, følgd av det franske framlegget og the norske
framlegget. Dei tre metodane som byggjer på rettferdsprinsipp medfører alle relativt større
avvik frå Kyotoprotokollen. På denne bakgrunn kan vi setje opp følgjande liste med metodar,
der metodane som politisk sett sannsynlegvis lettast kan bli gjennomført står først: 1. Japan II,
2. Det franske framlegget, 3. Det norske framlegget, 4. ’Betalingsevne’, 5. ’Suverenitet’, og 6.
’Egalitær’. Dersom ein derimot legg meir vekt på den andre konklusjonen ovanfor kan ein
argumentere for at ’Betalingsevne’ bør ha ei høgare plassering på lista, og kanskje til og med
få førsteplassen. Argumentet for dette er at det er urettferdig, og dermed også mindre politisk
akseptabelt, å krevje at relativt fattige omstillingsøkonomiar skal redusere sine utslepp meir
enn OECD land.
Mellom landa i Austersjø-området kan Polen brukast som eit ”tilnærma utviklingsland” på
grunn av relativt lavt brutto nasjonalprodukt per capita og gjennomsnittlege utslepp av
klimagassar per capita. I eit slikt perspektiv kan dei mest lovande metodane for å involvere
utviklingsland vere ’Betalingsevne’ og det franske framlegget, sidan desse metodane
sannsynlegvis vil medføre relativt mjukare mål for utviklingsland enn dei andre metodane.
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
The aim of this study is to contribute to exploring the potential of differentiation methods for
national greenhouse gas reduction targets. Such methods can also be referred to as burden
sharing methods or schemes. As a first step in such an exploration project a survey of existing
proposals is helpful. One of the important principles included in the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) from 1997 is
differentiation of targets among countries. However, the differentiation scheme that came out
of the Kyoto Protocol was not founded on a specific method, but rather based on negotiations
given the various interests and national circumstances of the parties.1 Our opinion is that a
more systematic approach to differentiation will facilitate future negotiations. Assuming that
the Kyoto Protocol will be ratified by enough Parties and enter into force, future negotiations
will be needed to determine targets after 2012.2 Sooner or later there will also be a discussion
on commitments for developing countries, and what criteria and burden sharing arrangements
that should apply in such cases.3 Finally, there is a possibility that EU will need to re-
negotiate its present differentiation of targets according to the Triptique approach, if the
present commitments turn out to be much more challenging than anticipated for some of the
member states.4 More elaborated approaches and methods for differentiation will not solve all
political differences and problems, but could be helpful and contribute a guiding framework
for climate policy negotiations, confer Ringius et al. (1998) and Torvanger et al. (1996).
We employ three levels or concepts for describing differentiation methods in the analysis. The
first level relates to one or more fairness or justice principles that might be supported by the
proposal. Second, a proposal’s main feature is the formula or rule specified. Finally, the
methods require operational indicators (i.e. data or criteria), see Ringius et al. (1998).
Three sources of methods or proposals are employed. The first is proposals from the Ad Hoc
Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) process that was initiated by the Berlin Mandate at the
first Conference of the Parties (COP1) to the UNFCCC in the spring of 1995, and ended up in
the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997.5 From this negotiation process we identified and
selected all proposals that implied some type of differentiation of targets. Consequently we
left out all proposals for flat-rate targets (i.e. where parties should reduce their emissions by
the same percentage). Altogether this came to 17 proposals made by a single party or groups
of parties. The second source is the European Community’s Triptique approach for
                                                          
1
 The final targets in the Kyoto Protocol vary from a Party being allowed to increase its greenhouse gas
emissions by 10% in the target period 2008-2012 compared to 1990, to parties having to reduce their emissions
by 8%.
2
 The first 5-year target period of the Kyoto Protocol is 2008-12. By year 2005 the Parties should show
demonstrable progress in achieving their commitments.
3
 Developing countries, the so-called non-Annex I countries, do not have any commitments to reduce their
emissions of greenhouse gases in the Kyoto Protocol. However, due to the fast increase of emissions from this
group of countries, their share of annual global emissions may reach 50% by the middle of the next century. One
possibility is to agree that a country should take on commitments to reduce its emissions as soon as its level of
development reaches a specific level, such as the gross domestic product per capita of the poorest group of
OECD countries. Annex I countries are industrialized countries, as defined in an annex to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
4
 The present scale of differentiation within the European Community is from an increase in emissions by 27%
compared to 1990, to reduction of emissions by 28%.
5
 An interesting survey of possible methods for differentiation from the early phase of the negotiations is found
in UNFCCC (1996), FCCC/AGBM/1996/7. This document was prepared for the 4th AGBM meeting in Geneva
in July 1996.
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differentiation of targets among its member states. The third source is recent academic
literature, where we have included 8 contributions in the period 1992 to 1998 that we find
interesting. The proposals are presented in a catalogue style. We have not included other
Parties’ reactions to these proposals during the negotiations, since this would require a more
extensive analysis of the negotiations than has been possible in this study.
For the purpose of showing differentiation consequences of some of the proposed methods,
we supply some numerical illustrations for the Baltic Sea region. The countries in this region
are the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic
countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), in addition to Germany, Poland, and the Russian
Federation. Within this geographical region the variation in national resource bases and level
of development is large enough to give a good test of the proposed methods.
In chapter two the framework for reviewing differentiation methods is discussed, where a
number of organising principles are mentioned. The next chapter of the report presents the
catalogue review of proposals from the AGBM negotiation process, where the 17 proposals
are divided into 8 groups according to common features. In chapter four a review of selected
recent literature is presented. This is followed by an evaluation of the proposals in chapter 5,
where the 5 most promising methods are selected according to four criteria. In chapter 6 the
same 5 proposals are explored through numerical illustrations. Given the joint Kyoto Protocol
reduction target for the countries in the Baltic Sea region we compare the burden sharing
consequences for one proposal or method across countries, and for one country across the
methods or proposals. Finally, in chapter 7, the political feasibility of the methods is
evaluated. This evaluation is based on the results from chapter 6, and a comparison to the
Kyoto Protocol outcome and the internal differentiation scheme of the European Community.
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 )UDPHZRUNIRUUHYLHZRIGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ
PHWKRGV
One or more organising principles or dimensions is useful in a survey of burden sharing
proposals to make the survey more accessible and facilitate comparison of proposals. The
challenge is to choose a principle that is helpful for this purpose given the heterogeneous
features of the proposals. Some possible dimensions are:
1. Allocation, outcome- or process-based6
2. Dynamic or static
3. Based on single base year (e.g. 1990) (or period) emissions or accumulated historic
emissions
4. Supported fairness or justice principle
5. Global or regional relevance (where regional relevance could mean suitable for Annex I
countries only)
6. Reduction based or emissions allowance based targets
Dimension 1 refers to three main categories of rules, where the allocation-based focus is on
the initial allocation of emission allowances among countries. The outcome-based proposals,
on the other hand, focus on welfare effects generated by the proposals, whereas the common
feature of the process-based proposals is a focus on the process of allocating allowances to
emit greenhouse gases, confer Rose et al. (1998).
The second dimension refers to the framework of the proposal or method being static or
dynamic. An example of a static approach is the Norwegian proposal (no. 6). The Triptique
approach is an example of a dynamic method, where the base year and the growth projections,
etc., can be easily updated over time.
Next, the issue at hand is the historical responsibility for increased greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere. If historical responsibility is accepted the relevant emission
data could be accumulated emissions from a country since the industrial revolution around
1750 up till e.g. 1990. If historical responsibility is rejected we are left with emissions from a
single year or period as the reference data.
A number of fairness or justice principles exist, confer Rose et al. (1998), Ringius et al.
(1998) and Barrett (1992). One difficulty is that there is no simple one-to-one relation
between a fairness principle and a specific formula, meaning that one formula can be
supported by more than one principle, and one principle can support more than one formula.
Another difficulty with the proposals from the AGBM negotiation process is that fairness
principles seldom are clearly specified. In some cases one might be able to infer a principle
(or two or three principles) from the proposal text, however.
The fifth dimension refers to the flexibility of the proposals. Given that structural differences
increases as one moves from e.g. Nordic countries to OECD countries, and even more to non-
Annex I countries, a proposal of global relevance must be able to handle larger structural
differences than a more limited, regional proposal. Obviously, some of the proposals from the
AGBM negotiations seem to be more flexible than other proposals, confer Table.
                                                          
6
 See Rose et al. (1998), Table 1.
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Finally, the sixth dimension relates to the burden sharing scheme being based on allowances
to emit greenhouse gases, like the French convergence proposal, or if it is based on the
determination of reductions among the countries of a group, like the Norwegian proposal.
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 5HYLHZRIGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQSURSRVDOVIURPWKH
$*%0QHJRWLDWLRQV
Based on the six dimensions in Chapter 2 and common features among the proposals we have
organised the 17 proposals from the AGBM process into 8 groups. The grouping is shown in
Table, where the proposals are given a reference number. The main common feature of a
group of proposals is emphasised. One of the features to be considered is the explicit or
implicit reference to one or more fairness principles. Furthermore a more detailed summary of
the reviewed proposals is shown in table 2. There are numerous proposals that are based on
flat percentage reductions. These are, however, not examined further in this study.
7DEOH*URXSLQJRIEXUGHQVKDULQJSURSRVDOVIURPWKH$*%0SURFHVV
*URXS 3URSRVDOV
Convergence 1. France
2. Switzerland
3. EU
Historical responsibility 4. Brazil
5. Brazil-RIVM
Multi-criteria formula 6. Norway
7. Iceland
Fossil fuel dependency 8. Australia
9. Iran
Menu-approach 10. Japan I
11. Japan II
Triptique 12. EU’s Triptique approach
Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita
13. Poland et al.
14. Estonia
15. Poland and Russia
16. Korea
Cost-effectiveness 17. New Zealand
7DEOH6XPPDU\RISURSRVDOVIRUEXUGHQVKDULQJPHWKRGVPDGHE\SDUWLHVLQWKH$G+RF*URXSRQWKH%HUOLQ0DQGDWH$*%0QHJRWLDWLRQV
IndicatorsRef.
no.
Proposal When
proposed
Fairness
principle
Main features
CDE CDE/
Pop
CDE/
GDP
GDP/
Pop
S CDE CDEexp/
CDEtot
dPop/dt EXP/
FF
CDE/
km2
Other
1 France Dec. 96 Egalitarian Progressive burdens compared to
emissions. Convergence
X
2 Switzerland Dec. 96 Egalitarian Progressive burdens compared to
emission Convergence
X (X)
3 EU Mar. 97 Egalitarian Convergence X X
4 Brazil May 97 Polluter pays Burdens corresponds to cumulative
emissions
X
5 Brazil-RIVM Nov. 98 Polluter pays Burdens corresponds to cumulative
emissions
X
6 Norway Nov. 96 Egalitarian,
Ability to pay
Multi-criteria formula X X X
7 Iceland Jan. 97 Egalitarian,
Ability to pay
Multi-criteria formula X X X RE/TE
8 Australia Jan. 97 Mixture Unweighted set of 5 indicators X X
(Proj.)
X X (Proj.) X
9 Iran Mar. 97 Mixture Unweighted set of 8 indicators X X More
10 Japan I Dec. 96 Sovereignty,
Egalitarian
Parties can choose 1 of 2 indicators X X
11 Japan II Oct. 97 Sovereignty,
Egalitarian
Parties can choose 1 out of  3 indicators X X X X
12 Triptique 1997 Horizontal,
Ability to pay
Multiple set of indicators
13 Poland et al. Mar. 97 Polluter pays,
Ability to pay,
Egalitarian
Unweighted set of 4 indicators X X X X
14 Estonia Mar. 96 Ability to pay,
polluter pays
Two possible indicators X (X)
15 Poland and the
Russian Fed.
Aug. 95 Mixture Unweighted set of 7 indicators X X X More
16 Korea Feb. 97 Ability to pay,
Polluter pays
Unweighted set of 3 indicators X X X
17 New Zealand Nov. 96 None Global least cost Eq. marg.
abatement
costs
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CDE: Level of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions.
CDE/Pop: Carbon dioxide equivalent emissions per capita.
CDE/GDP: Carbon dioxide equivalent emissions per gross domestic product.
GDP/Pop: Gross domestic product per capita.
S CDE: The cumulative historical emissions contributing to global warming.
CDEexp/CDEtot:The share of emissions resulting from production of goods for export
(first of all the energy intensive industrial sector) relative to total national
emissions.
dPop/dt: Population growth.
EXP/FF: Fossil fuel intensity of export.
CDE/km2: Carbon dioxide equivalent emissions per square kilometer of a country’s
territorial basis.
RE/TE: A country’s consumption of renewable energy compared to total energy
consumption in the country.
(Proj): projected.
(X): Subsidiary to X, i.e. X is the main criterion, but (X) could also be taken into
consideration.19
n explanation of the fairness principles used in table 2 follows below in table 3.
DEOH6HOHFWHGIDLUQHVVSULQFLSOHVDQGUHODWHGEXUGHQVKDULQJUXOHV
)DLUQHVV
SULQFLSOH
,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ ([DPSOHRILPSOLHGEXUGHQVKDULQJUXOH
Egalitarian Equal rights of people to use the
atmospheric resources
Reduce emissions in proportion to population
or equal per capita emissions
Sovereignty Current rate of emissions
constitutes a status quo right now
Reduce emissions proportionally across all
countries to maintain relative emission levels
between them
Horizontal Similar economic circumstances
have similar emission rights and
burden sharing responsibilities
Equalise net welfare change across countries
(net cost of abatement as a proportion of
GDP is the same for each country)
Ability to Pay/
Vertical
The greater the ability to pay the
greater the economic burden
Net cost of abatement is positively correlated
with per person GDP
Polluter pays Carry abatement burden
corresponding to emissions
(eventually including historical
emissions)
Share abatement costs across countries in
proportion to emission levels
ources: Rose (1992), ABARE and DFAT (1995), Bureau of Industry Economics (1995), Burtraw and Toman
1992).
he catalogue format chosen for the review of differentiation methods proposed during the
GBM negotiation process is the following:
. Name and reference of proposal.
. Who made the proposal, when, and on what occasion.
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c. The main features of the proposal.
d. Summary. Could the method potentially be helpful for future negotiations, possibly in a
further developed version.
In addition EU’s Triptique approach is included.
*URXS&RQYHUJHQFH
The principal common feature of proposal 1 (France), 2 (Switzerland), and 3 (EU) is
convergence of per capita emissions over time. This means that those countries that have high
1990 per capita emissions must reduce their emissions more than countries that have
relatively low per capita emissions. In the long run, by year 2100 according to the French
proposal, all countries would meet at the same per capita emission level.
)UDQFH
a. French contribution to the AGBM before EU developed a joint position.
Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1, p. 25
b. France prepared the following proposal in December 1996 for the 6th session of the
AGBM, Bonn, 3-7 March 1997.
c. The French proposal is based on a reduction in emissions to reach an atmospheric
concentration of 550 ppmv of CO2 as a future goal, and has a “per capita” approach as the
main element for burden sharing. According to IPCC’s second assessment report, this
concentration level can be obtained if average per capita level of CO2 and other GHGs
emissions are in the range of 1 to 2.7 tons of carbon equivalent within the Annex I Group
by the end of the next century. On this basis, France proposes that burdens should be
distributed so that the emission pathways converge to similar per capita or per unit of
GDP levels by the end of the next century. Numerically, the proposal is designed as
follows:
10/110/9
2000,2010, C·= LL ((
Where:
(L FDUERQGLR[LGHHTXLYDOHQWHPLVVLRQVLQ\HDUIRUFRXQWU\L
(L FDUERQGLR[LGHHTXLYDOHQWHPLVVLRQVLQ\HDUIRUFRXQWU\L
; (PLVVLRQJRDOSHUFDSLWDIRUDOOFRXQWULHVLQ
The resulting commitments in 2010 given some levels of per capita emissions in year
2000 are shown in
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7DEOH7KH)UHQFKFRQYHUJHQFHSURSRVDO
Per capita emission
in 2000
Per capita emission
objective for 2010
Average percentage
reduction 2000-2010
3 teC/cap 2.8-2.9 teC/cap 5,0%
4 teC/cap 3.7-3.8 teC/cap 6,3%
5 teC/cap 4.5-4.6 teC/cap 9,0%
6 teC/cap 5.3-5.4 teC/cap 10,8%
The burdens are in other words defined so that countries with high per capita emissions
must undertake a larger percentage reduction in emissions.
d. The French proposal is interesting as a method of implementing a long-term atmospheric
stabilisation target, and due to its focus on convergence of per capita emissions in all
countries. But, even with 100 years time horizon the proposal might seem idealistic when
aiming for complete convergence.
6ZLW]HUODQG
a. Switzerland. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1.
b. The Swiss proposal was prepared in December 1996 for the 5th session of the AGBM in
December 1996.
c. The Swiss proposal addresses the emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O and targets a 10%
reduction of the total GHG emissions of Annex I Parties by the year 2010 compared to the
1990 levels. It states that countries should be grouped in categories differentiated by
increments of 5 tons of annual CO2-equivalent emissions per capita. Burdens should then
be distributed so that countries with the highest CO2-emissions would be obliged to
achieve the biggest emission reduction. The proposal opens for adjustments to this rule if
a Party has a large energy-intensive exporting industrial sector.
d. The Swiss proposal is in general simple to handle. It shows some similarities to the French
proposal. Exactly how the different groups of emitters shall be treated is however not
explicitly defined.
(8
a. Framework compilation of proposals from Parties for the elements of a protocol or
another legal instrument. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/2, p. 31.
b. France and Spain made the proposal, in submission by the EU. The proposal was prepared
for the 6th session of the AGBM, Bonn, 3-7 March 1997.
c. Annex I Parties would adopt greenhouse gas emissions paths converging eventually to
similar levels of emissions per capita or per unit of GDP leading to an overall emissions
reduction within specified time-frames.
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d. This proposal is difficult to evaluate since the level of specification is low.
*URXS+LVWRULFDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\
The main common feature of proposal 4 (Brazil) and 5 (Brazil-RIVM) is the emphasis on
historical responsibility for global warming, in terms of accumulated contribution to radiative
forcing or temperature increase in the atmosphere since the industrial revolution.
%UD]LO
a. The Brazilian contribution to the AGBM.
Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.3, p. 3.
b. Brazil prepared the following proposal in May 1997 for the 7th session of the AGBM,
Bonn, 31 July-7 August 1997.
c. The proposal for burden sharing is designed so that Parties receive a burden that
corresponds to the same Party’s responsibility for contributing to climate change. In order
to quantify this contribution, cumulative historical emissions needs to be estimated, which
together with the state of the art knowledge in the natural science field can produce
relevant information for this criterion. The proposal is designed in order to be applied to
all Parties, including developing countries.
d. This proposal is interesting since it includes accumulated historical emissions by a country
and calculates the its responsibility in terms of atmospheric warming. One limitation is
that only fossil fuel based CO2, CH4 and N2O is included. Responsibility of the present
generation for past emissions when global warming was unknown, is a disputable
principle.
%UD]LO5,90
a. The Brazilian proposal and other options for international burden sharing. Source: Berk
and Elzen, (1998).
b. The proposal was presented by the Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and
the Environment (RIVM) at the COP-4 in Buenos Aires, November 1998. The proposal is
in general a technical revision of the previous Brazilian proposal, giving suggestions for
elements that could be improved.
c. After the proposal was presented at the AGBM in August 1997, Berk and Elzen (1998) at
the RIVM, carried out a more in depth study of the technical parts of the proposal, which
was presented as a discussion paper in Buenos Aires, 1998. Among the conclusions it is
worth mentioning that the technical methodology in the original Brazilian proposal was
incorrect and needed to be improved. It overestimated the contribution of the Annex I to
temperature change relative to non-Annex I. It would be preferable to use a multi-gas
approach, including all sources and sinks. Furthermore, it seemed preferable to estimate
the contribution to concentrations or radiative forcing rather than temperature changes.
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Finally they considered it more equitable to use the per capita contribution rather than
using the absolute contribution to temperature or concentration increase.
d. This is an improved version of the Brazilian proposal under number 4. Some weaknesses
are reduced due to new data and better models, making the method preferable to the
original Brazilian proposal.
*URXS0XOWLFULWHULDIRUPXOD
The Norwegian (no. 6) and Icelandic (no. 7) proposals are to a large extent overlapping. They
are multi-criteria rules containing indicators for Ability to pay (GDP per capita), Egalitarian
(emissions per capita), and ‘energy efficiency’ (emissions per unit of GDP).  Deviations from
average value (of the group of countries) of one or more of these indicators generate a burden
above the average percentage emission reduction required in the group.
1RUZD\
a. Norwegian contribution to the AGBM negotiation process.
Source: FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2/Add.2, p. 25. The formula was developed through a
research project documented in Torvanger et al. (1996).
b. Norway prepared the following proposal in November 1996 for the 5th AGBM session in
Geneva in December 1996.
c. A formula considers a Party’s percentage reductions of greenhouse gas emissions based
on the three indicators: CO2 equivalent emissions per unit of GDP (indicator for emission
intensity), and GDP per capita and CO2 equivalent emissions per capita are included to
induce an equitable outcome7. The formula is:
Yi = A[x(Bi/B)+y(Ci/C)+z(Di/D)]
Where Yi is percentage reduction if emissions for Party i. Bi is CO2 equivalent emissions
per unit of GDP for country i, and B is the equivalent average for the group of countries
(i.e. the Annex I countries). Likewise Ci and C are GDP per capita for country i and for
the average of the group, and Di and D are CO2 equivalent emissions per capita for
country i and the average of the group. x, y and z are weights that add up to one. A is a
scale factor to ensure that the desired overall reduction in emissions for the group of
countries is achieved.
d. The Norwegian multi-criteria formula is relatively simple, but has quite some capacity
built into it to handle countries with different emission, population and economic
development structures, in particular due to its multi-criteria nature. However, it is a
relatively static top-down approach and consequently not sensitive to differences between
economic sectors as driving forces for emissions.
                                                          
7
 According to previous proposals submitted by Norway, emission figures were to be based on a country’s future
emissions, following the business as usual scenario. However, according to FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2/Add.2,
p. 25, this is no longer explicitly stated.
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,FHODQG
a. Submission made by the Government of Iceland to the UNFCCC, AGBM.
Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1, p. 28.
b. Iceland prepared the following proposal in January 1997 for the 6th session of the AGBM,
Bonn, 3-7 March 1997.
c. The Icelandic proposal is expressed as a formula consisting of the following four
elements.
- GHG emission intensity (measured per capita) (+)8
- GDP per capita (+)
- Level of GHG emissions (+)
- Share of renewable energy sources (-)
All GHGs should be included; counting both sources and sinks. The proposal does not
specify the weights of each element, nor the aggregate reduction in emissions for all
Parties. In a later proposal by Iceland dated October 1997 the criteria “level of GHG
emissions” is replaced by “CO2 emissions in industrial processing as a share of party’s
total CO2-emissions (-)”.
d. This proposal is very similar to the Norwegian proposal, the main difference being
inclusion of the share of renewable energy sources as a fourth component.
*URXS)RVVLOIXHOGHSHQGHQF\
The most important common feature of proposal 8 (Australia) and 9 (Iran) is dependency of
income on fossil fuel exports. In addition both proposals include economic growth and
population growth.
$XVWUDOLD
a. Further submission by Australia, dated 15 January 1997.
FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2/Add.2, p. 3.
b. The Australian paper is dated 15 January 1997.
c. The Australian proposal for burden differentiation is to be applied to all Annex B
countries and includes all GHGs, all sources and sinks. The following set of criteria
should be used in order to ensure equal percentage changes in per capita economic welfare
across Annex B Parties from mitigation action:
- Projected population growth. (-)
                                                          
8
 The following notation is used throughout the document. (+) indicates that the criteria is positively correlated to
the size of the burden. E.g. in the Icelandic proposal, the higher the emissions per capita are, the larger should the
Party’s burden become.
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- Projected real GDP per capita growth (-)
- Emission intensity of GDP (+)
- Emission intensity of exports (-)
- Fossil fuel intensity of exports (-)
d. The Australian proposal is relatively complex since there are 5 criteria that need to be
quantified, and since two of them deals with projected figures. The method is not
specified in detail, however, it is only meant to function as a framework for negotiations.
,UDQ
a. Main elements for inclusion in a protocol or another legal instrument. Submitted by the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1, p. 30
b. Iran prepared the following proposal for the 6th session of the AGBM, Bonn, 3-7 March
1997
c. The proposal contains a list of criteria that could be considered when differentiating
burdens. These criteria are:
- Economic growth
- Historical share
- Dependency on income from fossil fuels
- Access to sources of renewable energy
- Defence budget
- Population growth
- Special circumstances
- Share in international trade
There are no specifications on how each element should count.
d. The proposal is vague. It contains some unique indicators, such as defence budget.
*URXS0HQXDSSURDFK
Even if there are a number of differences between the two Japanese proposals 10 (Japan I)
and 11 (Japan II), they have one important common feature, namely the menu-approach.
According to these proposals a country may choose one of two or three options that make its
emission reduction commitment smallest. The proposals also imply a well-defined upper
constraint on commitments.
-DSDQ,
a. Japan; Proposals on the elements to be included in the Draft Protocol to the UNFCCC.
Source: FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2/Add.4, p. 3
b. The Japanese proposal was prepared 9 December 1996 for the 5th session of the AGBM in
December 1996.
&,&(525HSRUW
A survey of differentiation methods for national greenhouse gas reduction targets
26
c. The Japanese proposal is to be applied to all Annex I countries, other Parties are to take
voluntary measures. The proposal gives an Annex I Party the possibility to choose one out
of two paths.
- To maintain its anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide over a five year period at
an average yearly level not more than S tonnes of carbon per capita, or
- To reduce its anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide over a five year period at an
average yearly level of not less than Tper cent below the level of the year 1990.
d. The Japanese proposal is original in the way that Parties can choose between two
completely different criteria. Although the values of the parameters Sand T not are
specified, it seems that Parties with high per capita emissions could benefit using the
second strategy, were as low per capita emitters could benefit from the first strategy.
-DSDQ,,
a. Japanese proposal as presented in FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.6, p. 13.
b. This Japanese proposal was submitted in October 1997 for the 8th session of the AGBM,
Bonn, 22-31 October 1997.
c. The Japanese proposal covers the gases CO2, CH4 and N2O. In general, each Annex I
country shall reduce emissions by 5% in the first budget period (2008-2012) compared to
1990 levels. However, countries with the following conditions may apply any one of the
following alternative reduction rates:
(a) For a country of which emissions per GDP in 1990 (A) are less than the emissions per
GDP of all Annex I countries in 1990 (B):
Alternative reduction rate (%): = 5% ·  (A/B)
(b) For a country of which emissions per capita in 1990 (C) are less than the emissions per
capita of all Annex I countries in 1990 (D):
Alternative reduction rate (%): = 5% ·  (C/D)
(c) Similar alternative reduction rate for countries with high population growth must be
developed.
Under no circumstance shall any country’s emissions exceed its 1990 levels.
d. This Japanese proposal would effectively reduce emissions from Annex I to less than 5%
as many countries by definition have lower than average emissions with respect to one of
the two variables described above or population growth. Hence, there will be extensive
use of the alternative reduction rate options.
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*URXS7ULSWLTXH
Among the proposals we have listed, EU’s Triptique approach is unique due to the bottom-up
approach, where the economy is divided into three sectors. Thus there are no other proposals
in this group.
(8¶V7ULSWLTXHDSSURDFK
a. The Triptique approach was developed by Block et al. (1997) at the University of Utrecht.
b. The methodology for this burden-sharing key was developed on the request of the
Netherlands Presidency.  The motivation for the request was to develop a method for
distributing emission commitments across members of the European Community.
c. The main motivation for the approach was to develop a method that would take into
account the differences in emission-producing activities across the member states. It is
important to note that the approach not only determines the distribution of commitments
but also the aggregate level of emissions from the member states. As a first step in the
Triptique approach, emissions were divided in three groups.
• Emissions from electricity generation
• Emissions from the internationally oriented energy-intensive industries
• Emissions from other domestic sectors
Emissions are in general treated differently across the groups, but equally across the
member states. No other greenhouse gas (GHG) than carbon dioxide is included in the
analysis.
The electricity-generating sector showed large variation across the states regarding
emissions of CO2. First of all, the total consumption (and production) of electricity in the
EU was set to be limited to a growth rate of 1% per year, instead of the 1.5% that was
used as the conventional wisdom projection. Some extra allowance was given the
cohesion countries.9 Carbon dioxide emissions were then to be distributed taking into
account;
- minimum percentages for the penetration of renewable energies and combined heat
and power (CHP)
- limitation of oil and coal use
- use of nuclear power according to national preferences
- remainder to be supplied using natural gas
The energy-intensive part of the industrial sector was allowed to increase production at a
constant rate across all countries.10 The same energy efficient improvement rate was also
applied across the member states for this sector, leading to a fixed reduction factor for
CO2 emissions for all countries.
                                                          
9
 Consisting of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.
10
 Consisting of the following industries: building materials, chemical, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, pulp
and paper, refineries, coke ovens (if they were not a part of the iron and steel industry), gasworks and other
energy transformation branches, where electricity generation is excluded.
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Emissions from the domestic sectors were distributed on a per capita base.11 The main rule
was that emissions per capita should converge to the same level across all countries at a
certain point in the future (e.g. 2030) that is 20 or 30% lower than in 1990. The allowance
in 2010 was then calculated using linear interpolation between actual figures in 1990 and
desired level in 2030. The emission levels were only corrected for variations in natural
climate across the countries.
d. It is important to remember that the above method is only applied in order to calculate a
particular distribution of burdens. How a country satisfies commitments is entirely up to
the country itself. This method is one of the few that has actually been used in practice in
this field, and should therefore be considered as a possible tool for future burden sharing.
However, it is also important to be aware of the relative homogeneity across the members
of the European Community in terms of economic structure and output, historical and
present responsibility for possible climatic changes, abatement costs and vulnerability to
climate changes. For this reason, it is difficult to predict how well this method can be
adapted to a broader group of countries.
*URXS*'3SHUFDSLWD
The common feature of proposal 13 (Poland et al.), 14 (Estonia), 15 (Poland and the Russian
Federation), and 16 (Korea) is the focus on the GDP per capita as an important indicator for
distributing commitments. GDP per capita can be interpreted as a proxy variable for Ability to
pay. In addition some of these proposals, but not all, have a reference to emissions per capita
and/or contribution to global emissions.
3RODQGHWDO
a. Framework compilation of proposals from Parties for the elements of a protocol or
another legal instrument. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1, p. 75.
b. The proposal was prepared on behalf of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia for
the 6th session of the AGBM, Bonn, 3-7 March 1997.
c. Each Annex I Party should have some flexibility in adopting emission reduction
objectives. The following criteria should be used for this purpose:
- GDP per capita;
- Contribution to global emissions;
- Emissions per capita and/or emission intensity of GDP.
d. This proposal is difficult to evaluate due to a low level of specification.
                                                          
11
 Consisting of households, services, light industry, agriculture and transportation.
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(VWRQLD
a. Possible features of a protocol or another legal instrument. Estonia.
Source: FCCC/AGBM/1996/7, p. 15.
b. The Estonian proposal was prepared 15 January 1996 for the 3rd session of the AGBM,
Geneva, 5-8 March 1996.
c. The Estonian proposal should be applied to a “basket” of gases including sinks. The main
criteria for differentiation could be GDP per capita. In addition it opens for the
incorporating of a Party’s contribution to global warming.
d. This proposal is difficult to evaluate due to a low level of specification.
3RODQGDQGWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ
a. UNFCCC, Implementation of the Berlin Mandate, Poland and Russia.
Source: FCCC/AGBM/1995/MISC.1/Add.1, p. 54.
b. The proposal was prepared by Poland and the Russian Federation in August 1995 for the
2nd session of the AGBM in Geneva 30 October-3 November 1995.
c. The proposal states that the criteria used to distribute reduction commitments should
reflect social, economic and some climatic parameters relevant in the context of
sustainable development. The following criteria were mentioned:
- GDP per capita;
- Amount of anthropogenic emissions, first of all of carbon dioxide and methane, per
capita and per unit of territory;
- Amount of sinks and net emissions per capita and per unit of territory;
- Levels of production and consumption of energy per capita.
d. The proposal contains similar elements to the ones described above, except for the
consideration of a country’s territorial area.
.RUHD
a. A proposal on the Elements in a Draft Protocol or Amendment of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by the Government of the
Republic of Korea. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.1, p. 13.
b. The following proposal was prepared by Korea in February 1997, for the 6th session of the
Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM), Bonn, 3-7 March 1997.
c. The Korean proposal focuses on three principles that all should be considered when
distributing emission reduction commitments: burden sharing based on equity and
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, cost effectiveness
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and harmony with economic development and an open international economic system.
The equity principle is to be taken care of by distributing emission allowances across
Annex I Parties according to cumulative emissions of GHGs since the industrial
revolution to a certain target year. The burdens should also be connected to a country’s
capability measured in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and based on the
elasticity of emissions of GHG in terms of GDP.
d. The method contains elements that are common to other proposals, but does not define the
exact key for burden sharing.
*URXS&RVWHIIHFWLYHQHVV
New Zealand (no. 17) has supplied the only proposal in this group. The special feature of this
proposal is the emphasis on cost-effectiveness. According to the proposal commitments
should be distributed so as to equalise marginal abatement costs across countries.
1HZ=HDODQG
a. Greenhouse gas stabilisation: Principles to guide the formulation of possible targets &
policies and measures. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2/Add.4, p. 15.
b. New Zealand prepared the following proposal in November 1996 for the 5th session of the
AGBM in December 1996.
c. The key element of the New Zealand position is that emissions reductions should be
achieved at global least cost. A least cost approach does not neglect equity; rather, a least
cost approach improves the prospects of finding an equitable outcome acceptable to all. If
differentiated commitments are considered it is important that this is on the basis of a
simple principle that reduces the disparity between Parties in terms of abatement costs
implied by uniform targets. One possible option would be to aim to share commitments in
a manner consistent with the outcome expected if marginal costs were equalised. Clearly
there are a range of options which could reduce cost disparities.
d. The New Zealand proposal focuses on designing a protocol that ensures a global least cost
solution, but not on burden sharing as an issue separated from cost-effectiveness.
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 5HYLHZRIVHOHFWHGOLWHUDWXUH
The literature on burden sharing in the context of international climate policy agreements is of
a rather recent date. The first studies have addressed the burden sharing issue in the context of
allocating carbon quotas or allowances among countries, whereas more recent contributions
analyse differentiation of targets. In this chapter we review recent contributions from the
academic literature. The studies are shown in Table 5 together with supported fairness
principles and main features.
7DEOH6XPPDU\RISURSRVDOVIRUEXUGHQVKDULQJPHWKRGVIURPUHFHQWOLWHUDWXUH
5HI
QR
3URSRVDO :KHQ
SURSRVHG
)DLUQHVVSULQFLSOH 0DLQIHDWXUHV
18 Claussen
and
McNeilly
1998 Horizontal
Vertical
Polluter pays
Countries divided into three tiers
according to standard of living,
responsibility, and opportunity
19 Rose et al. 1998 Sovereignty
Egalitarian
Horizontal
Vertical
Consensus equity
Welfare implications for world regions;
non-linear programming model
20 Rose &
Stevens
1998 Egalitarian
Sovereignty
‘No harm’
Emissions trading in dynamic model;
extend Kyoto Protocol to DCs
21 Rose 1992 Horizontal
Vertical
Ability to pay
Rawls’ maximin
Egalitarian
Other principles
Tradable emission quotas; calculate
welfare changes for large countries
22 Rowlands 1997 Reactive historical
Proactive historical
Ahistorical
Equality or efficiency
Emission targets for OECD countries
given each rule
23 Ridgley 1996 Egalitarian
Ability to pay
Other principles
Multiple criteria methodology;
lexicographic optimisation
24 Kawashima 1996 Egalitarian
Ability to pay
‘Emissions needs’ to set targets for Annex
I countries; tests single-criterion and multi-
criteria rules
25 Barrett 1992 Sovereignty
Egalitarian
Ability to pay
Kantian allocation rule
Other principles
Tradable emission quotas; game-theoretic
analysis of outcomes for large countries
&ODXVVHQDQG0F1HLOO\noting that the non-systematic differentiation approach of
the Kyoto Protocol negotiation outcome is not sufficient as a basis for future negotiations,
explore important elements for a fair differentiation scheme at the global level. They propose
to build on three criteria, responsibility for present and past emissions of carbon dioxide,
standard of living (or ability to pay), and opportunity to reduce emissions. On this basis they
come up with a division of countries into three tiers. The first tier is “Must act now”,
containing most current Annex I countries (among them Denmark, Germany, and Norway)
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and some developing countries. The third tier “Could act now”, contains developing countries
of extremely low income. Finally, the second tier, “Should act now, but differently”, lies
between the two other tiers and contains mostly developing countries (but also the Baltic Sea
region countries Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Sweden).
5RVHHWDOstudy alternative equity criteria for global warming policy. The criteria
are divided into allocation-based, outcome-based and process-based criteria. By employing a
non-linear programming model they examine the welfare implications of the alternative
criteria for major world regions. The results indicate that the net abatement cost is almost the
same for several criteria. However, criteria such as the Egalitarian principle and consensus
equity show rather extreme results.
5RVHDQG6WHYHQV analyse fairness aspects of the current Kyoto Protocol and its
development into a global treaty where also developing countries get reduction targets. They
employ a tradable emission quota framework and a dynamic model of emissions trading
among countries. Developing countries are divided into two groups according to per capita
income being higher or lower than USD 1000, where in one scenario the first group take on
commitments in 2010 and the other in 2020. They find particularly large gains from
interregional trading when developing countries participate with quotas based on their 2010
(and subsequent years) projected emissions. For quota distributions according to the
Sovereignty or Egalitarian principle there is also a large global gain, primarily because
developing countries make earlier commitments than otherwise likely.
5RVH presents a thorough analysis of ten international equity principles. The
principles are used to allocate carbon entitlements with and without trading to eight major
countries and world regions. Both static reference and dynamic reference bases are employed.
The dynamic reference bases take into account cumulative emissions. Alternative equity
principles are shown to lead to widely different welfare implications for the world regions.
Trading reduces these differences to a large extent.
5RZODQGV examines rules for the allocation of GHG emissions among OECD
countries. The rules are divided into six categories according to the relevance of historical
emissions (i.e. reactive historical, proactive historical, and ahistorical) and emphasis on
equality or efficiency. He calculates the emission reductions generated for each country and
rule, and then concludes that the rules produce very different results for the various OECD
countries. Finally he proposes a twin-track strategy, consisting of flat-rate targets in the short
term and differentiated targets in the longer term.
5LGJOH\ describes an approach to find the ‘relative accountability’ of multinational
regions for reducing GHG emissions. Various approaches are discussed and divided into
equity based approaches, on the one hand, and indices and target based approaches, on the
other hand. Next, a survey of multi-criteria decision methods is presented in which the
methods are divided into principle or performance based methods, and interactive or non-
interactive methods. He argues that such methods have a high potential for developing
compromise burden sharing schemes. The author illustrates the multiple criteria methodology
by defining eleven equity indicators and combining them by employing a lexicographic
optimisation method. He shows that the resulting accountability profile over the eleven
multinational regions produces a high degree of fairness.
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.DZDVKLPDstarts out with differentiation of targets for the Annex I countries in
the FCCC. As the first step she determines CO2 ‘emission needs’ based on the three countries
with lowest emissions. A population-based rule, a GDP-based rule, and a multi-criteria rule
(population, GDP, carbon intensity, temperature and area) are examined, where five sectors
are specified. In the second step the emission baselines developed in the first step are
employed to set targets. One alternative is to set targets in proportion to the emission
baselines. Another alternative is to set targets in proportion to the difference between actual
emissions and the baseline. The main finding is that the multi-criteria rule yields less
difference between the smallest and largest target for a country than single-criterion rules.
%DUUHWW observes that ethical rules often serve as focal points when negotiating
international agreements. He proceeds to present a brief overview of thirteen allocation rules
for tradable carbon emission entitlements. Next, he undertakes an analysis in a game-theoretic
framework of outcomes for the United States, the Soviet Union, China and rest of the world.
A ‘Kantian’ rule is explored. From this rule countries choose abatement levels at least as high
as the uniform abatement level they would like all countries to observe. This rule outperforms
all other rules, and the outcomes come close to the co-operative solution, and with the
‘Kantian’ rule all countries are better off than in the case of no agreement.
All these studies are interesting contributions to the analysis of burden sharing methods
applied to climate politics, for instance in terms of rules for initial allocation of emission
quotas in a trading system. However, the methods employed are not easily applicable to actual
negotiations since they often are complex and depend on specific economic models. All
parties would have to accept a single model framework to use these methods, which seems
less realistic. The three-tier approach by Claussen and McReilly (1998) has a higher score on
political feasibility, but needs further refinements to become operational. Thus the
contributions from the literature in general get a low score on criteria 1 and 2 in chapter 5. We
have therefore chosen not to evaluate these methods further in chapter 5, but concentrate the
evaluation of methods on proposals from the AGBM negotiation process.
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 (YDOXDWLRQRISURSRVDOV
The main criteria used for the evaluation of the proposed differentiation methods is the
usefulness for future climate policy negotiations, either in its present form or based on a
modified version of the proposal. More specifically the four criteria are:
1. Political acceptability (e.g. support from major Parties).
2. Feasibility related to the negotiations (simplicity and reliability).
3. Is the method of regional or global relevance (i.e. Annex B or also non-Annex B
countries)?
4. The potential for developing the method further.
In addition to these criteria our choice has been constrained by the extent to which specific
methods are operational. For some proposals both the formula and indicators are well defined,
and can be supported by easily available data. Other proposals are not fully specified. In the
literature there are also methods that assume that a specific economic model is available to
calculate welfare changes. Furthermore it is assumed that the model and its results are
acceptable to all parties, which seems to be less realistic. Given the four criteria above and
these additional considerations we ended up with a list of 5 proposals that seem most
promising and potentially helpful for future negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol for target
periods after 2012, such as 2013-17. The list is shown in Table  together with the score on the
four criteria.
7DEOH7KHPRVWSURPLVLQJSURSRVDOVDQGVFRUHRQHYDOXDWLRQFULWHULD
352326$/ 3ROLWLFDO
DFFHSWDELOLW\
+KLJK
0PHGLXP
/ORZ
)HDVLELOLW\
+KLJK
0PHGLXP
/ORZ
*OREDO*RU
UHJLRQDO5
UHOHYDQFH
)XWXUH
SRWHQWLDO
+KLJK
0PHGLXP
/ORZ
a. Japan II M H G M/H
b. France M H G M/H
c. Norway M H R M/H
d. Brazil-RIVM M M G M/H
e. Triptique H M R M/H
This list does not imply any ranking of the proposals with respect to helpfulness for future
negotiations. In our opinion such a ranking would be premature at this point. In the next
chapter some numerical illustrations for the proposals are given.
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 7KHPRVWSURPLVLQJPHWKRGV&RQVHTXHQFHVIRU
FRXQWULHVLQWKH%DOWLF6HD5HJLRQ
Numerical illustrations are given for the first three proposals in Table . With regard to the last
two proposals, Brazil-RIVM and Triptique, they require more data and calculations than what
is feasible in this study. Consequently, the numerical illustrations in this section are limited to
Japan II, France and Norway. In addition we include methods based on the fairness principles
Sovereignty, Egalitarian, and Ability to pay, (as explained in Table ) confer e.g. Rose et al.
(1998). Other methods from recent literature are not further explored since they are based on
economic models and relatively complex formulae, or are not fully specified, thus giving a
low score on criteria 1 and 2 in chapter 5.
 'DWDDQGEDVH\HDU
More sophisticated methods for burden sharing are relevant for the negotiations for the second
target period 2013-17. To provide numerical illustrations of the proposals chosen we need
data, which depend on the base year chosen. On this background one could assume that the
Kyoto Protocol targets are achieved in 2010, and then negotiate a common target and
differentiation of targets among the Parties for 2013-17. In this case year 2010 could be
referred to as the new base year. If 2010 is chosen as a new base year we would need
projections for gross domestic product (GDP) and population. However, to limit data
uncertainty we have chosen to employ 1990 data and implement the Kyoto targets in the
group of countries. Consequently we frame the problem at hand as testing implications of the
burden sharing proposals for the countries in the Baltic Sea region. We compare the burden
sharing consequences of one proposal across the countries, and then the burden sharing
consequences for one country across the proposals. We furthermore assume that the Kyoto
Protocol target for the group of countries is met, and that all six gases and groups of gases are
included. If data on the three industrial gases are missing, we still treat the data as complete,
thus containing all gases. For our purpose this should be acceptable, and in particular since the
share of the three industrial gases is likely to be small for most countries.
In order to carry out a numerical analysis on the chosen proposals and general methods, four
kinds of data were needed for all countries. Emission data are taken from
FCCC/CP/1998/11/Add.2. Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland have not reported
emissions of the industrial gases, HFC, PFC and SF6 for year 1990, and only CO2, CH4 and
N2O are included for these countries. For all other countries, all six gases are reported12. The
other three kinds of data were taken from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook, (UN,
1997) contributing with 1990 data for population size, population growth and GDP per
capita.13 When calculating the overall target for the group as stated in the Kyoto Protocol, we
have, for the member countries of the European Community (EU), chosen the reduction rates
agreed upon internally within the EU. A summary of the input data used in the analysis is
                                                          
12
 The emission figure for Denmark is the actual 1990 emissions of 71 837 kt CO2 equivalents. However,
according to Jørgen Abildgaard at the Danish Energy Agency, Denmark’s commitment to a 21% reduction in the
period 2008-2012 is based on a 1990 level of about 80 million tonnes corrected CO2-equivalents (J. Abildgaard,
personal communication 15 April 1999).
13
 Population growth was based on changes in population in the period 1990-1995. GDP per capita data were not
corrected for purchasing power parities.
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presented in table 6. The reduction rates are presented in the column ‘Kyoto Target’, and are
given as an emission factor to be multiplied with the 1990 emissions in order to achieve the
commitment.
7DEOH'DWDXVHGLQWKHDQDO\VLV
Country Population Annual Pop. GDP/capita GHG emiss. Kyoto Target
1000 growth , % USD/capita kt CO2 eq. Index 
Denmark 5 140              0.3 % 25 122            71 837            0.79                
Estonia 1 571              -1.2 % 7 605              40 719            0.92                
Finland 4 986              0.5 % 27 037            64 546            1.00                
Germany 79 365            0.6 % 21 533            1 212 467       0.79                
Iceland 255                 1.1 % 24 480            2 889              1.10                
Latvia 2 671              -1.2 % 7 020              35 669            0.92                
Lithuania 3 722              0.0 % 5 218              51 548            0.92                
Norway 4 241              0.5 % 24 882            54 011            1.01                
Poland 38 119            0.3 % 1 547              546 286          0.94                
Russia 148 292          0.0 % 6 539              3 040 332       1.00                
Sweden 8 559              0.6 % 26 844            66 457            1.04                
Total 296 921          5 186 761       
Weighted Average 0.22 % 11 428            0.94                
The overall emission reduction required in this group of countries in order to fulfil the Kyoto
Protocol is calculated to be 6.0 percent.
 1XPHULFDODQDO\VLV
 3URSRVDOVSHFLILFUHVXOWV
In this section we describe the methodology used to quantify burden shares and present the
results according to the proposals.
6RYHUHLJQW\
When burdens are allocated so that relative emission levels between all countries are to
remain constant, all countries will have to reduce emissions by the same percentage. Formally
we have:
1
1990,
,
-=
WRW
.3WRW
L &'(
&'(
5
Where:
5L 5HGXFWLRQUDWHDSSOLHGWRFRXQWU\L
&'(WRW.3 7RWDOFDUERQGLR[LGHHTXLYDOHQWHPLVVLRQVIRUWKHJURXSRIFRXQWULHVUHTXLUHGWR
IXOILOWKH.\RWR3URWRFRO
&'(WRW 7RWDOFDUERQGLR[LGHHTXLYDOHQWHPLVVLRQVIRUWKHJURXSRIFRXQWULHVLQ
This rule implies that the reduction rate of all countries becomes 6.0 percent.
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(JDOLWDULDQ
When calculating the distribution of emission reductions that could occur if burdens were to
follow the Egalitarian principle, the required average per capita emissions needed to fulfil the
Kyoto Protocol were applied to all countries. The country-specific reduction rates are hence
calculated by applying the following formula.
1
/
/
1990,,
1990,1990,
-=
WRW.3WRW
LL
L 3RS&'(
3RS&'(
5
Where:
&'(L3RSL &DUERQGLR[LGHHTXLYDOHQWHPLVVLRQVSHUFDSLWDE\FRXQWU\LLQ
&'(WRW.3 7RWDOFDUERQGLR[LGHHTXLYDOHQWHPLVVLRQVIRUWKHJURXSRIFRXQWULHVUHTXLUHGWR
IXOILOWKH.\RWR3URWRFRO
3RSWRW 7RWDOSRSXODWLRQLQWKHJURXSRIFRXQWULHV
The results are presented in Figure 1.
)LJXUH(JDOLWDULDQGLVWULEXWLRQRIHPLVVLRQV&KDQJHVFRPSDUHGWR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As Figure 1 indicates, Russia and Estonia will need to reduce emissions, all other countries
can increase. Sweden could more than double emissions, as their per capita level today is
relatively low.
$ELOLW\WRSD\
We consider a simple rule that can be interpreted as based on the Ability to pay fairness
principle. In our example, we consider the per capita GDP in a country, and assume that no
country is allowed to increase emissions. The distribution of burdens follows the relative GDP
per capita compared to the average of the group, scaled in order to achieve the overall
reduction level.
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Where:
5L UHTXLUHGUHGXFWLRQUDWHE\FRXQWU\L
*'3L3RSL *URVVGRPHVWLFSURGXFWSHUFDSLWDLQFRXQWU\L
*'3D3RSD $YHUDJHJURVVGRPHVWLFSURGXFWSHUFDSLWDLQWKHJURXSRIFRXQWULHV
a  6FDOHIDFWRUPXOWLSOLHGWRUHGXFHHPLVVLRQVWRWKHUHTXLUHGOHYHOFDOFXODWHGWREH
The results are presented in
Figure 2.
)LJXUH'LVWULEXWLRQRIHPLVVLRQVDFFRUGLQJWRWKH$ELOLW\WRSD\SULQFLSOH&KDQJHV
FRPSDUHGWROHYHOVSHUFHQW
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The distribution of emissions in this case follows directly from the GDP per capita figures. As
indicated by Table 6, Finland has the highest production per capita and will hence share the
largest burden per capita. Poland, earning only about 15% of the average of all countries is
assigned the smallest reduction rate. The formula used to illustrate consequences if the Ability
to pay approach is followed, is not the only Ability to pay approach that could be used to
quantify the distribution of burdens. Another approach could be to let relatively poor
countries increase their emissions, while the wealthier take on larger reductions. In that case it
would be necessary to introduce a scalar that defines the boundaries of the emission changes.
7KHVHFRQG-DSDQHVHSURSRVDO
The second Japanese proposal enable countries to choose the most favourable of three criteria
with the restriction that each country shall reduce emissions in the range of zero to five
percent. However, the criterion that favours countries with high population growth was not
explicitly defined in the Japanese paper. In lack of this definition we have made a suggestion
of how this could be accomplished. Countries with a lower population growth than the
average (which is 0.22% per year) cannot choose this criterion. However, countries with a
higher population growth than 0.22 % per year, can divide the average population growth by
its own growth, multiply this value by the default reduction rate and choose this approach.
This method seems reasonable for the data set we are dealing with in our analysis. It is
however, important to note that this method can produce peculiar results if for instance the
average growth is negative.
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The proposal defines the overall reduction, which in our case turned out to be –3.9 percent. To
make the analysis comparable to the other proposals, we increased the five-percent limit to
7.6 percent, so that overall reductions equalled the reduction for this group of countries in the
Kyoto Protocol (6.0 percent). The outcome was defined for each country by the following
formula:
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Where:
5L 5HGXFWLRQUDWHDSSOLHGWRFRXQWU\L
0LQ DIXQFWLRQWKDWFKRRVHVWKHDUJXPHQWVHSDUDWHGE\LQVLGHWKHEUDFNHWVZLWKWKH
VPDOOHVWYDOXH
&'( FDUERQGLR[LGHHTXLYDOHQWHPLVVLRQVSHU\HDU
3RS 3RSXODWLRQ
*'3 JURVVGRPHVWLFSURGXFW
d 3RS d W SRSXODWLRQJURZWKRYHUWKH\HDUFRPPLWPHQWSHULRG
L LQGLFDWHFRXQWU\L
D LQGLFDWHDYHUDJHRIWKHJURXSRIFRXQWULHV
The results are presented in Figure 3. Information on the argument that would give the most
beneficial outcome for the Party is also included.
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As Figure 3 illustrates, Russia and Estonia would not benefit from any of the criteria and is
assigned the default 7.6 percent reduction rate. Latvia and Lithuania would prefer the
emission per capita criteria, reducing emissions with 5.8 and 6.0 percent. Iceland, Germany
and Poland would prefer the population growth criteria and reduce emissions by respectively
1.5, 2.8 and 5.6 percent, whereas Denmark (-2.8%), Finland (-2.4%), Norway (-2.5%) and
Sweden (-1,4%) all would use the emissions per GDP criterion.
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7KH)UHQFKSURSRVDO
The French proposal aims at equalling emissions per capita of all countries in the year 2100 at
a level in the range of 1 to 2.7 tonnes of carbon per year (which is equivalent to 3.67-9.90 t
CO2-eqv. per year). In order to achieve this, countries are to follow emission paths that
converge to a specific common level. According to our calculations, a 2100 goal of 7 t CO2-
eqv per year would impose a 15 percent reduction in emissions for our group of countries. In
order to reach the 6 percent reduction rate that is required in our analysis, the 2100 goal was
set to 12.5 t CO2-eqv. per year. As the formula presented in the French proposal used the year
2000 as base line, some adjustments were needed in order to match the schedule in our
analysis. The adjusted formula is as follows.
11/211/9
1990,2010, C·= LL ((
Where:
(L FDUERQGLR[LGHHTXLYDOHQWHPLVVLRQVLQ\HDUIRUFRXQWU\L
(L FDUERQGLR[LGHHTXLYDOHQWHPLVVLRQVLQ\HDUIRUFRXQWU\L
; (PLVVLRQJRDOSHUFDSLWDIRUDOOFRXQWULHVLQ 
The resulting reduction rates are presented in Figure 4.
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According to the French proposal only Sweden and Iceland have emissions per capita that are
below the required average in year 2100 and can hence increase emissions.
7KH1RUZHJLDQ3URSRVDO
The Norwegian proposal is a three-criterion formula. The weight of each criterion was in the
original proposal subject to negotiation, but in later proposals they were equalised to one
third. The formula is:
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Where:
5L UHGXFWLRQUDWHDSSOLHGWRFRXQWU\L
&'( FDUERQGLR[LGHHTXLYDOHQWHPLVVLRQVSHU\HDU
3RS SRSXODWLRQ
*'3 JURVVGRPHVWLFSURGXFW
L LQGLFDWHFRXQWU\L
D LQGLFDWHDYHUDJHRIWKHJURXSRIFRXQWULHV
$ VFDODUHTXDOWR
The scalar A is equal for all countries and the value assigned is set so that the overall
reduction level is achieved. This burden-sharing rule produced the following set of reduction
rates.
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The reduction rates derived from the Norwegian proposal are in a fairly close range running
from 4 to 7 percent with the exception of Poland which is assigned a reduction rate of 11
percent.
Results for all countries and proposals/methods are shown in table 8.
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7DEOH'LVWULEXWLRQRIHPLVVLRQVDFFRUGLQJWRDOOSURSRVDOVDQGDOOFRXQWULHV&KDQJHV
FRPSDUHGWROHYHOVSHUFHQW
Ability to pay Egalitarian Sovereignty JAP II French Norwegian
Denmark -14.3 % 17.5 % -6.0 % -2.8 % -2.1 % -5.1 %
Estonia -4.3 % -36.6 % -6.0 % -7.6 % -12.5 % -6.6 %
Finland -15.4 % 26.9 % -6.0 % -2.4 % -0.7 % -5.1 %
Germany -12.2 % 7.5 % -6.0 % -2.8 % -3.6 % -4.8 %
Iceland -13.9 % 45.0 % -6.0 % -1.5 % 1.7 % -4.7 %
Latvia -4.0 % 23.0 % -6.0 % -5.8 % -1.3 % -3.9 %
Lithuania -3.0 % 18.6 % -6.0 % -6.0 % -1.9 % -4.5 %
Norway -14.1 % 29.0 % -6.0 % -2.5 % -0.4 % -4.9 %
Poland -0.9 % 14.6 % -6.0 % -5.6 % -2.5 % -10.6 %
Russia -3.7 % -19.9 % -6.0 % -7.6 % -8.7 % -5.7 %
Sweden -15.3 % 111.6 % -6.0 % -1.4 % 9.0 % -4.5 %
All -6.0 % -6.0 % -6.0 % -6.0 % -6.0 % -6.0 %
 &RXQWU\VSHFLILFUHVXOWV
The results presented in the previous section were shown proposal by proposal for all
countries. In order to illustrate the implications of the different methods on each country we
will in this section present the same figures country by country. For illustrative reasons, we
have also included the emission reduction targets that are stated in the Kyoto Protocol.14 The
country-specific figures, which are displayed on page 44 to 47, can be grouped into three
categories, where the countries in each category show showing similar responses to the
various burden-sharing rules.
• Group 1: The Nordic countries and Germany.
This group of countries would all be allowed to increase emissions substantially if the
burden-sharing rule was defined by the Egalitarian principle. They would also be most
seriously affected if the rule were based on Ability to pay. Sweden and Iceland would be
able to increase emissions if burdens were distributed according to the French proposal.
Germany and Denmark are in the Kyoto Protocol subject to the most severe reductions in
emissions, compared to any of the burden sharing rules examined in this chapter. All other
rules would for all countries in this group imply reduction rates in the range of zero to 6
percent.
• Group 2: Russia and Estonia.
Russia and Estonia would under all circumstances need to reduce emissions. The most
severe effects would occur if the burdens were distributed according to the Egalitarian
rule. The other rules would imply reduction rates in the range of 4 to 12 percent. In the
Russian case, the Kyoto Protocol allows higher emissions than all other burden sharing
rules.
• Group 3: Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
These countries show patterns that are between the first and the second group. They would
all benefit from the Egalitarian burden-sharing rule, that rule being the only one were
emissions are allowed to increase. The other principles would require emission reductions
in the range of 1 to 11 percent. The Kyoto Protocol implies the most severe emission cuts
for Latvia and Lithuania.
                                                          
14
 For the EU countries we have used the targets agreed upon internally within the EU, see Table .
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It is important to be aware of the fact that the burden-sharing rules based on single fairness
principles (Egalitarian, Sovereignty and Ability to pay), are extreme in the sense that they
employ a single principle to meet targets already by the year 2010. These rules therefore
generate larger variation in targets. According to the Egalitarian principle for example, all
countries except Russia and Estonia can increase emissions substantially, where as the former
two countries would need large reductions. It is perhaps more surprising that for all the other
proposals in this analysis (Japan II, France and Norway), all countries would need to reduce
emissions in the range of 0 to 12 percent, the exception being Sweden and Iceland in the
French proposal. It is, however, important to bear in mind that emission burdens calculated
under the Ability to pay rule was defined such that no country could increase its emissions.
Even though burdens in general will become larger in the Russian and Estonian case, these
countries have large reductions in their business as usual emission scenarios and expensive
measures would therefore not necessarily be needed.
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 6XPPDU\
Comparing the distribution of commitments across countries generated by the differentiation
proposals we find that the span between the largest and smallest targets is much larger for the
single fairness principles Egalitarian and Ability to pay than for the proposals from the
climate negotiations. The Japan II proposals distribute targets between –1,5% to –7,5%. The
same figures for the French proposal are +9% to –12%, and for the Norwegian proposal –4%
to –11%. In the same three proposals Estonia and the Russian Federation have to reduce their
emissions by much more than the average. In the Norwegian proposal the heaviest burden
falls on Poland. According to the French proposal Sweden and Iceland are allowed to increase
being the case of the Egalitarian rule). Denmark, Germany, Latvia and Lithuania their
emissions due to a relatively low present emission level per capita.
Turning to the country specific results, the Kyoto Protocol is, compared to the burden sharing
rules, favourable for Russia, and to some extent for Iceland, Norway and Finland (the
exemption being the case of the Egalitarian rule). Denmark, Germany, Latvia and Lithuania
have relatively strict Kyoto Protocol targets, and would receive more comfortable targets
given any of the burden sharing rules considered here. The Nordic countries and Germany are
allowed to increase their emissions substantially given the Egalitarian principle. However,
given the Ability to pay principle these countries would get a much larger burden than the
other countries. The results for the proposals from the climate negotiations all lie between
these extremes. Latvia, Lithuania and Poland would also benefit relatively from the
Egalitarian principle in terms of being allowed emissions increases. All the other principles
and proposals require reduced emission, and in a range between –1 to –11%. Finally, Estonia
and the Russian Federation will loose if the Egalitarian principle is chosen, since they then
would have to carry out substantial emission reductions. For the other proposals these two
countries have to reduce their emission by –4% to –12%.
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 $QHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHSROLWLFDOIHDVLELOLW\RIWKH
SURSRVDOV
With the aim to evaluate the political feasibility of the various differentiation methods we
compare the results from chapter 6 across the countries in the Baltic Sea region, and divide
them into OECD (which consists of the Nordic countries and Germany) and EIT (which
consists of the three Baltic countries, Poland and Russia) countries.15 Furthermore, we
interpret the outcome of the Kyoto Protocol (and the internal differentiation scheme within the
European Community) as an example of a politically feasible differentiation scheme, which
may then serve as a benchmark for comparison with the differentiation methods evaluated
here.
The differentiation methods’ deviations from the Kyoto Protocol outcome are calculated as
the absolute percentage deviation of the target produced by a method and the Kyoto Protocol
target, and summed over all countries for each differentiation method. As an example the
deviation for Norway for the Japan II proposal is (1% + 3%) = 4%, and the deviation for
Germany in the case of the Egalitarian method is (21% + 8%) = 29%. All these results are
presented in Table, where also the sum for each method over all countries is given together
with a ranking. A small sum consequently shows that the deviation from the Kyoto Protocol
outcome is smaller than in the case of a larger sum.
7DEOH7KHGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQSURSRVDOV¶SHUFHQWDJHGHYLDWLRQIURPWKH.\RWR3URWRFRO
RXWFRPH
'LIIHUHQWLDWLRQ
SURSRVDO
6RYH
UHLJQW\
(JDOL
WDULDQ
$ELOLW\
WRSD\
-DSDQ,, )UHQFK 1RU
ZHJLDQ
Denmark 15 39 7 18 19 16
Finland 15 27 6 2 1 5
Iceland 16 35 24 12 8 15
Norway 7 28 15 4 1 6
Sweden 10 108 19 5 5 8
Germany 15 29 9 18 17 16
Poland 0 21 5 0 3 5
Estonia 2 29 4 0 4 1
Latvia 2 31 4 2 7 4
Lithuania 2 27 5 2 6 4
Russia 6 20 4 8 9 6
SUM 90 394 102 71 80 86
RANKING 4 6 5 1 2 3
On the basis of these observations we can draw the following tentative conclusions:
1. The Sovereignty and Egalitarian methods seem less interesting. The first method
yields no differentiation, and the latter is too extreme in the short run since it equalises
per capita emissions of greenhouse gases in a group of countries where there are large
differences in this respect.
                                                          
15
 EIT is an acronym for Economies in Transition to a market economy.
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2. The Ability to pay method puts the largest burden on the OECD countries, whereas
the Japan II proposal, the French proposal, and to some the degree the Norwegian
proposal, put the largest burden on EIT countries.
3. All the methods explored provide Russia with a stricter target than the Kyoto Protocol,
while the opposite situation is the case for Denmark and Germany.
4. Japan II is the proposal that yields targets closest to the Kyoto Protocol, followed by
the French and the Norwegian proposal. The three methods based on fairness
principles cause larger deviations from the Kyoto Protocol outcome.
Based on this analysis, and in particular table 9, one might claim that a ranking of the
differentiation methods according to political feasibility would be:
1. Japan II
2. French
3. Norwegian
4. Ability to pay
5. Sovereignty
6. Egalitarian
However, putting more emphasis on the second conclusion above, one might argue that the
Ability to pay method should have a higher ranking, and maybe be ranked in first place. The
argument for this would be that it is unfair, and consequently also less politically feasible, to
demand that the relatively poorer EIT countries should reduce their emissions by a larger
percentage than the OECD countries. A contra argument could be that there are more
opportunities for cheap emission reductions in the EIT countries due to low energy efficiency
in their economies, so that the ranking above is still the most realistic in terms of political
feasibility.
Among the countries in the Baltic Sea region Poland might be taken as proxy of a developing
country due to its relatively low per capita GDP and its average per capita emissions of
greenhouse gases. In such a case the most promising methods for involving developing
countries are based on the Ability to pay principle and the French proposal, since these
methods are likely to yield relatively softer targets for developing countries. In this context we
leave out the Egalitarian and Sovereignty proposals for reasons explained earlier in this
chapter.
Finally, we should not forget the Triptique and Brazil-RIVM methods that could give
interesting results of a high political feasibility, which we unfortunately have not be able to
analyse further in this study.
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